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Summary findings
Research shows that education has played a crucial role  education is neutral and higher levels of instruction are
in raising levels of earnings and that returns to education  moderately regressive. In the central region primary
in Mexico have increased, particularly in higher  schooling is very progressive, while lower secondary
education and in the upper tail of the conditional  schooling is almost neutral. Upper secondary and tertiary
earnings distribution.  instruction strongly benefit the richest income deciles. In
Lopez-Acevedo  and Salinas examine patterns of public  the southern region basic (primary and lower secondary)
spending on education in the face of further increases in  education is very progressive, upper secondary education
earnings inequality.  is neutral, and tertiary education is highly regressive. In
They analyze the incidence of benefits using two sets  Mexico City all levels of education except primary are
of data: data on unit costs per student by state and by  strongly regressive.
education level, and data from surveys on household  Lopez-Acevedo  and Salinas show that public spending
income and spending. Among their findings:  at the tertiary level is more regressive than household
* Nationally, the poorest income groups get most of  spending. So much of public spending on tertiary
the national and state subsidy for primary education. At  education favors nonpoor  families in urban areas that to
higher education levels the poor get progressively smaller  reallocate the spending so that poor students have a
subsidies.  chance to participate would require developing credit
* For all Mexico, government spending on primary  markets for higher education. The government's role
education is very progressive. In lower secondary  should be to help overcome market failures in the
education it is neutral. And in upper secondary education  financial sector, which limit the availability of long-term
it benefits mainly the middle and upper classes. Tertiary  financing for higher education. These failures can be
education is strongly regressive, benefiting mainly the  corrected through student loan programs or means-
richest deciles and mainly in urban areas.  tested financial aid and scholarship programs. Such
* But those government patterns vary by region. In  programs are rarely devoid of subsidy  but are preferable
the central region average total spending is more  to the direct, cost-free provision of services because the
uniformly distributed than the national pattern.  In the  subsidy is targeted more closely to the source of market
northern region the subsidy is progressive. Primary  failure.
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Abstract 2
Research  has shown  that education  in Mexico  has played  a crucial  role in the process  of earnings  formation
and that  returns  to education  have increased  only  in the higher  levels  of education  and in the upper tail of
the conditional  earnings distribution.  This paper examines  the public  educational  expenditure  patterns  in
the face of possible  further increases  in earnings  inequality.  Several  benefit-incidence  analysis  are carried
out bringing  together  two  important  and unique  sources  of information  unit cost  per student  by state  and  by
educational  level as well as data from  the households  income  and expenditures  surveys.
Some  of the most interesting  results  are: i) at national  level the poorest  income groups  receive  the bulk
of primary  education  subsidy  (federal plus state expenditures),  while at higher levels of education  they
receive  progressively  smaller  subsidies.  ii) Government's  educational  expenditure  pattern  changes  across
regions.  That is, in the North  Region  primary  education  is near equality  line and regressive  for other  levels
of instruction.  In the Central  Region,  primary  schooling  lies above the equality  line  while lower  secondary
is very  close  to it. Upper  secondary  and tertiary  instruction  benefit  the richest income  deciles.  In the South
Region,  basic  education  is very progressive,  upper secondary  is at the equality  line and tertiary  education
level lies below the 45-degree  line. In Mexico  City, the cumulative  distribution  at all levels of education,
except  for primary,  is far below  the 45-degree  line.
It is also shown that public expenditures  at the tertiary  level is more regressive  than the pattern of
household  expenditure.  A large share of public  resources  given to this level of education  tends to favor
non-poor students in urban areas. This paper argues that a strategy to reallocate the education  public
expenditures  from a higher  to a lower  level of instruction  in order to favor the poor groups,  would  have to
involve  the development  of higher  educational  credit markets.  Meaning  that, the government's  appropriate,
role could  be to help overcome  market  failures  in the financial  sector,  which  limit the availability  of long-
term finance for investments  in higher education.  These failures can be corrected  through student loan
programs  or means-tested  financial  aid and scholarship  programs.  These programs  are rarely devoid of
subsidy  components,  but they are preferable  to a direct,  cost-free  provision  of services  because  the subsidy
is more  closely  targeted  to the source  of market  failure.
The  paper is part of a comprehensive  work  meant  to build  a poverty  and inequality  strategy  for Mexico.
This  research  was  completed  as part  of the "Earnings  Inequality  after  Mexico's  Economic  and  Educational  Reforms"
study  at the World  Bank.  We are grateful  to INEGI  and  SEP  (Ministry  of Education)  for providing  us with  the  data.
These  are  views  of the authors,  and  need  not  reflect  those  of the  World  Bank,  its  Executive  Directors,  or countries  they
represent.
2 This  paper  was  prepared  with  research  support  from  Monica  Tinajero.INTRODUCTION
Research has shown that education has played a crucial role in the process of earnings formation
and that the returns to education have increased only in the higher levels of education and in the
upper tail of the conditional earnings distribution 3. In this context, it is essential to analyze the
impact of the public educational expenditure on school enrollment, the groups that  have been
benefited  with  the  public  expenditure,  and  the  public  expenditure  trends.  Thus,  this  paper
investigates  government's  educational  expenditure  patterns  in  the  face  of  possible  further
increases in earnings inequality. In doing so, a benefit-incidence analysis is carried out using unit
cost per student by state and by educational level.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents a short description of the data. Section 2
has a brief review of the educational system in Mexico. Section 3 discusses the two elements of
the benefit-incidence analysis: enrollment and educational expenditures in Mexico, also examines
the distribution of total subsidies allowance for  each state, across the levels of education and
income deciles. Section 4 compares the education subsidies by levels of schooling for  1994 and
1996. The last section presents the concluding remarks.
I  DA TA
This paper uses the data from the National Household Income and Expenditures Survey (ENIGH)
for  1996. The  ENIGH  is  collected  by  the  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadistica,  Geografla e
Informdtica (INEGI). This survey is available for 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 19964.  Each survey
is  representative  at  national  level,  urban  and  rural  areas.  For  1996,  the  ENIGH  is  also
representative for  the  states  of Mexico,  Campeche, Coahuila, Guanajuato,  Hidalgo, Jalisco,
Oaxaca and Tabasco.
The survey design was stratified, multistage and clustered. The final sampling unit was the
household and all the members within the household who were interviewed. 5 In each stage, the
selection probability was proportional to the size of the sampling unit. Then, it is necessary to use
the weighs 6 in order to get suitable estimators. The available information can be grouped in three
categories:
•  Income and consumption: the survey has monetary, no monetary and financial items.
*  Individual characteristics:  social  and  demographic,  i.e.,  age,  school  attendance,  level  of
schooling, position at work, economic sector, etc.
*  Household characteristics.
In addition,  data from the Direccion General  de Planeacion,  Programacion y  Presupuesto
(DGPPyP, Ministry of Education) regarding educational government expenditures (Federal plus
state) assigned to the different levels of schooling for each state is used in order to calculate the
unit costs.
2  PUBLIC EDUCATioNAL  SYSTEM
The structure of Mexico's educational system has the following main characteristics described as
follows. First, there is basic education, which is the government's  priority. The basic education
system consists of: i) early childhood education (or pre-school), which is optional for children 3
3 Lopez-Acevedo, Gladys et al.(1999)
'The  sample in a given year is independent from another.
' The sample size for 1996 is as follows: households 14,042 and individuals 64,359.
6 The weights should be calculated according to the survey design and corresponds to the inverse
of the probability inclusion.
2to 5 years old and  ii) mandatory primary education where the official entry age is 6 and ideally
should be completed in 6 years. In fact, due to late enrollment and grade repetition, however, the
target population is 6 to 14 years; iii) mandatory lower secondary school consist of a 3-year cycle,
and it is intended for children ages 12 to  16. At this level, the structure is divided in two areas:
general and  vocational/technical.  In parallel,  the  system  also  includes  the  telesecundaria,  a
distance education program designed to reach remote areas through the transmission of recorded
lessons via television network supported by face to face assistance from tutors.
The next level, following basic education, is middle level education with options available to
students who may choose technical schools and upper secondary education. The duration of these
programs is 3 years.  A high percentage of the students go  for  bachillerato  also called upper-
secondary which allows them  to pursue tertiary instruction. On the other hand, a demand for
technical studies has been increasing steadily in recent times. Finally, there is tertiary education.
This  level of education  encompasses three  lines  of study:  a  system  of federal technological
institutes, state and autonomous universities, and teacher-training institutes. There is at  least one
university for each state, and the large universities have campuses in various cities.
3  ENROLLMENTAND PUBLICEXPENDITURES IN THE  BENEFITINCIDENCEANALYSIS
The benefit-incidence methodology, which is applied in this paper, ranks individuals into groups
by income deciles. It then draws information on individual public school enrollment by state and
decile to tally up numbers of beneficiaries of each group. These numbers are then multiplied by
the government's  unit cost  of provision allowance for  each state and  educational level. This
provides  a  profile of  distribution  for  a  specific category  of  educational  public  expenditures
throughout the distribution of income or the "benefit incidence". Thus this technique assumes that
the benefit derived from education is equal to the government cost of providing this service.
The incidence analysis brings together two sources of information. First, data from income-
expenditure surveys (ENIGH) used to construct the deciles. The ENIGH surveys identify the
educational level, type of school and total income/expenditure. Second, government expenditures
(Federal plus state) on education assigned to the different levels of schooling for each state from
the  Direccion  General  de  Planeacion,  Programacion  y  Presupuesto,  DGPPyP,  (Ministry of
Education) used for calculating unit costs.
Equity issues are then analyzed using the Lorenz Curves based on the pattern of government
subsidies to education received by different population groups, highlighting the results of changes
in the use of educational services and changes in government's  expenditures for education by
levels and by state. 7
3.1  ENROLLMENT RA TES
As shown in table  1, variability of  enrollment between  poor and non-poor  individuals is not
substantial at the primary educational level. However, urban areas show slightly larger primary
enrollment  rates  than  in  rural  areas,  which  might  be  explained  by  higher accessibility  and
affordability to the private system. Enrollment rates  for the educational levels beyond primary
and probable lower-secondary levels decrease dramatically, particularly for the extremely poor,
thus resulting in an increase in the educational gap between poor and non-poor. Tables l.A and
2.A in the Annex show enrollment by educational level and types of schools used in the benefit
incidence analysis.
7 For  a review  see Dominique  Van  de Walle  and Kimberly  Nead (1995).
3Table 1. Total and Public Enrollment Rate by Poverty Status, Location and Level of Education
1996.  INEGI/CEPFAL  poverty line
Urban  j  Rural  Total
Poverty  Status  All  Public  All  Public  All  Public
Primary  (6-11  years  old)
Extreme  93.2  93.2  93.5  93.5  93.3  93.3
Moderate  96.4  96.4  94.6  94.6  96.0  96.0
Non-poor  96.1  95.7  96.4  96.3  96.1  95.7
Total  95.4  95.2  93.9  93.9  94.9  94.7
Lower  Secondary  (12-14  years  old)
Extreme  49.1  48.9  29.0  28.8  37.9  37.6
Moderate  68.7  68.8  51.0  51.2  64.8  64.9
Non-poor  81.4  81.3  59.5  59.8  79.1  78.8
Total  68.5  67.7  36.8  36.6  58.4  57.4
Upper  Secondary  (15-17  years  old)
Extreme  23.5  21.4  6.9  5.9  14.5  12.9
Moderate  39.6  36.8  22.2  21.7  36.0  33.5
Non-poor  61.7  54.0  24.5  21.8  58.0  50.1
Total  45.7  39.8  12.8  11.7  36.4  31.2
University  (18-24  years  old)
Extreme  3.4  2.9  0.4  0.4  1.8  1.6
Moderate  7.4  7.0  2.3  2.2  6.4  5.9
Non-poor  24.0  17.6  5.9  5.4  22.0  16.1
Total  15.3  11.5  2.0  1.8  12.0  8.9
Source:  Own calculations  based  on ENIGH,  1996
Given that coverage at primary level and the first years of lower secondary is already sizable
and decreasing due to demographic factors which cause the population in this group to stagnate
and start to shrink at the beginning of the next century. 8 This in turn frees some resources so that
coverage may be increased at the upper-secondary level.
3.  2  PUBLIC  EDUCATIONAL  EXPENDITURES
Total public educational spending per student in Mexico increased steadily up to 1994 and peaked
in 1998, even though the total student population increased from 26 million in 1994 to 28 and a
half million in 1998. By 1998, total spending in education increased by 5.2 percent of GDP, less
than a full percentage point  above the 4.9%  of GDP  reached in  1995. The federal government
currently accounts for close to 80% of total sector spending.
8From  1973-1994,  there was a change  in the population  structure:  the population  ages between one year through 14
dropped  36%,  between  those 15 and 64 increased  59.8%  and the age group  over 65  rose 4.2%.
4Figure I  Figure 2
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5000  Source
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A  desegregation of public expenditures in education by instruction level for  1994 and  1996 is
shown  below. Public expenditures in primary  and  lower  secondary absorb a  large proportion
(59%  in  1996)  of  federal  budgetary  resources  for  formal  education  services.  Yet,  public
expenditures in  upper  secondary and  tertiary  level were  13.7% and 27.3% each respectively.
Another observation about the evolution of educational public spending evolution is that it has
become more egalitarian in per-capita terms across different schooling categories. 9. In the early
1980s, the amount of federal spending per university student was 10 times the amount spent per
primary student. This ratio fell to arounld  7 times in the early 1  990s. Federal spending on the other
levels relative to thie  primary level indicates a similar decline, even though the absolute amounts
increased at all levels. In 1996, upper-secondary received  1.5 as much as each primary  school
student and each university student received five times as much as a primary student, compared to
2.1 and 6.8 in 1994, respectively (tables 2 and 3).
Table  2. Feea_n  tt  xedtrso  ulcEuain  94(huad  fcretpss
P  rimary  Lower  Secondary  Upper  Secondary  Tertiary
Federal Expenditure  17,947,229  8,603,383  6,610,913  13,141,420
State Expenditure  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Total Expenditure  17,947,229  8,603,383  6,610,913  13,141,420
Enrollment  13,593,797  4,661,522  2,386,758  1,461,189
60%
State  40edtr  ,2,2947747186,1  ,1,6
Subsidy per Student (pesos)  13206  1,864  2,7708  86,9947
1500~~~~~~~~~~~
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shownbelo.  Pubic  e  pedtrsiprimary Lower  werSecondary  *Uperseonda  Tareprortia  on
Federa Expnditure  feea  bdetr  esuce  o  33,328,32313,394,89810,884,85  21t,651,986
SaeExpendituresiupeseodrantetaylvlwe  8,90,29  474,40n1,69710  2,210,962tiely
Tnotalexpobendtreaio42,248,572tonofedcaioa  18,142304s12754,56  23,862,948hatitha
benrolment  r  gltaini  e-cpt  em  13,802,39i4,972,11  2,767,993  1,459,820  Intherl
Sub0sid  th  muto  eeapnigper  Snvrsttudent  (pesos)ti3,061h3,649u4,608e16,347
primary  student.e  hiqrtiivlltoarunenties  1.00e1.19  19  .51  Feealseni  34nte  te
TabeI 2  Fore  derGobieno, 1998.  edtue  nPbi  Euain  94  Tosnso  cretpss
Pimay  oerSeon;y  pprSeonaryTetirSource:  ENIGH  96 and DGPPyP  (1999),  SEP
3.3  BENEFIT INCIDENCE  ANALYSIS
Next, a comparison  was made between  the cumulative  distribution  of the various education  sub-
sectors and the distribution  of per capita  annual  total and federal  public educational  expenditures.
Beforesaid, in  order to  derive the  cumulative distribution for  various  educational levels,
individual  public school enrollment  by state and decile is multiplied by the government's  unit
cost of provision  allowance  for each state. This is also done subsequently  by region  and state.
Figures 3 and 4 show the cumulative distribution by total andfederal  educational expenditures
for all of Mexico. One of the main messages is that the poorest income/expenditures  deciles
receive  the bulk of the primary  education  subsidy.  This same group,  at higher levels of education
receives  progressively  smaller subsidies.  This indicates  that primary  education  is very progressive
and lower-secondary  education is basically neutral. Upper-secondary  schooling, benefits the
middle and upper classes.  Finally,  the tertiary  level is strongly  regressive  in that it mainly  benefits
the richest deciles. At national  level, public expenditures  seem  quite equal, as shown by the fact
that the expenditure  line lies very close  to the 45 degree  diagonal.
Figure 3  Figure 4
Cumulative  Distribution  of Total Education  Cumulative  Distribution  of  Federal  Education
Expenditures,  1996  National  Fxpenditures,  1996  National
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When desegregated  by region, see figures 5 and 6, it becomes  evident that the educational
inequality  in the Central  Region  of Mexico leads  the national  pattern. Still, in the Central Region,
the curve for total and federal schooling  expenditures  lies above  the equality  line. This implies
that on average total schooling  expenditures  for that region  are more uniformly distributed  than
the national  pattern.
6Figure  5  Figure 6
Cumulative  Distribution  of Total Education  Cumulative  Distribution  ofFederal  Education
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The distribution of the average subsidy in the South Region and Tabasco State lies above the
average distribution for the North Region (figures 7 through 10). One plausible explanation is the
higher concentration  of the  enrollment in the  lower deciles  (mainly  in primary)  in the  South
Region and Tabasco compared to the concentration in the North, where the students are in the
medium and top deciles. In the  South, public  enrollment is highly progressive  particularly  for
primary school, as shown by the fact that public school enrollment is above and far from the 45-
degree diagonal. It should also be mentioned that public education spending in upper-secondary
in Tabasco is basically neutral  at high level of income, while progressive at the bottom of the
distribution.
Figure 7  Figure 8
Cu mulative  Distribution of Total  Education  Cumnulative Distribution  ofFederal  Education
Expenditures,  1996 South  Region  Expenditures,  1996 South  region
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7Figure 9  Figure 10
Cumulative  Distribution of Total Education  Cumulative Distribution  of Federal Education
Expenditures, 1996 Tabasco State  Expenditures, 1996  Tabasco  State
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In the North Region (figures 11 and  12), the cumulative distribution of educational subsidy
lies below the 45 degree diagonal, except for primary schooling, which is near the equality line.
In general, this can be explained by both larger populations in the medium and top deciles and
higher enrollment rates  in higher levels, which  probably reflect higher  incomes in the North
Region and easier access to schools.
Figure 11  Figure  12
Cumulative Distribution ofTbtal Education  Cumulative  Distribution ofFederal Education
Expendcitures,  1996  North Region  Expenditures, 1996  North Region
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The distribution of per capita public expenditures in Mexico City (figures 13 and  14) is far
below the 45 degree diagonal indicating that it is very regressive. Public expenditures in primary
level are progressive for the high-income deciles, in that the primary curve  lies above the 45
degree axis and it is much more progressive than  the distribution of  per capita expenditures,
reflecting the fact that fewer higher income children attend public primary schools. Spending at
8the lower and upper secondary level is more progressive than the public expenditures, although
the curves still lie below the 45 degree diagonal. Only university instruction is more regressive
than the average distribution of total expenditures. Interestingly, public expenditures in education
in Nuevo Leon (see figures 15 and 16) are far below the 45-degree diagonal following a pattem
similar to Mexico City.
Figure  13  Figure  14
Cumulative  Distribution  oflbtal  Education  Cumulative  Distribution  of Federal  Education
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Figure  15  Figure  16
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The evidence presented suggests that public subsidies for education, particularly at the tertiary
level, are regressive. A large share of public resources is given to the high-income level students.
A strategy to reallocate public expenditures from tertiary to secondary level in order to favor the
poor would involve a comprehensive agenda that would meet the  challenges posed  in upper-
secondary level such as financing and quality of education.
94  COMPARISON  OF THE FEDERAL SUBSIDYDISTRIBUTION FOR 1994 AND 1996
This section compares the year  1994 and 1996 to assess a change over time in the targeting of
education spending. Figures 17 through 20 show the subsidy received by students in each income
decile for all levels of education in 1994 and  1996. As indicated, the subsidy in primary level
increased from 1994 through 1996. Such increment was slightly higher for the bottom income
decile as compared to the top deciles. In contrast, subsidies decreased from 1994 to 1996 for the
lower secondary level. Such reduction had a higher impact on deciles 6 through 9. For upper
secondary educational  level, per  capita  subsidies decreased on  average by  200,000 thousand
pesos for students in deciles 7 through 9. Finally, the tertiary level also experimented a reduction
of approximately 1,000,000 thousand pesos in the ninth decile.
In both years, the pattern is progressive for the primary level, as it was found in the previous
section, meaning that the subsidy is higher for the poor. On the other hand, the subsidy for upper
secondary and tertiary  levels is still regressive, benefiting mainly the  non-poor, although, the
distribution  of  subsidy has  become more  egalitarian  in  1996 compared to  1994. For  lower
secondary educational level, the middle income groups receive most of the subsidy.
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105.  CONCLUSIONS
Enrollment rates for the educational levels beyond primary and probable lower-secondary levels
decrease dramatically, particularly for the extremely poor, thus resulting in an increase in the
educational gap between poor and non-poor. Given that coverage at  primary level and the first
years of lower secondary  is already sizable and that  demographic pressure is decreasing, the
population of this group is virtually stagnated and will start to shrink at the beginning of the next
century. This  in turn  frees some public resources, which can  eventually be used to  increase
coverage at the upper-secondary level.
Government spending per student steadily increases until 1994 and stays the same until 1995,
peaking again in 1998. On the other hand, after 1994, government spending per student becomes
better distributed. Nevertheless, government spending still favors tertiary education. Spending on
education continues to be concentrated in the federal sector, which accounts for over 80 percent
of total sector spending.
Another noteworthy  observation about  the  evolution of  public  spending on  education  in
Mexico is that it has become a  little bit more  egalitarian in per-capita  terms across different
schooling categories. By moving towards a more evenly distribution of per capita spending across
different levels, equity seems  to have improved. At  the same time, the  external environment
changed in a manner that raised the relative return to higher education, thereby tending to make
more efficient what had initially been an inefficient allocation of resources.
With respect to the public educational expenditures by income strata, the results indicate that
at national level the poorest income groups receive the bulk of primary education subsidy (federal
plus state expenditures). This same group, at higher levels of education receives progressively
smaller subsidies and the pattern changes across regions. In the North Region, primary education
is near equality line and regressive for other levels of instruction. In the Central Region, primary
schooling lies above the equality line while lower secondary is very close to it. Upper secondary
and tertiary instruction benefit the richest income deciles. In the South Region, basic education is
very progressive, upper secondary is at the equality line and tertiary education level lies below the
45 degree line. In Mexico City, the  cumulative distribution at  all  levels of education, except
primary, is far below the 45-degree diagonal.
At national level, public subsidy for primary education slightly increases from 1994 through
1996. By contrast, subsidies for all other levels of education decreased. The pattern of primary
subsidy for both years is progressive meaning that the subsidy is higher for the poor. On the other
hand, subsidies for tertiary education are regressive, benefiting primarily the non-poor. Overall,
the distribution is slightly more egalitarian in 1996 than in 1994. Federal educational expenditures
on upper secondary level tend to be regressive. In 1994, the pattern was more regressive than in
1996. For lower secondary, the middle income groups receive the bulk of the subsidy. The public
educational system can improve its targeting to the poor by increasing its focus on the secondary
(lower and upper) levels versus university levels.
Public expenditure at  the  tertiary  level is  more  regressive than  the  pattern  of household
expenditure. A large share of public resources given to this level of education tends to favor non-
poor students in urban areas. A strategy to reallocate the educational public expenditures from a
higher to a lower level of instruction in order to favor the poor groups, would have to involve the
development of higher educational credit markets. Meaning that, the government's  appropriate
role could be to help overcome market failures in the financial sector, which limit the availability
of long-term finance for investments in higher education. These failures can be corrected through
student loan programs, or means-tested financial aid and scholarship programs. These programs
are rarely devoid of subsidy components, but they are preferable to a direct, cost-free provision of
services because the subsidy is more closely targeted to the source of market failure.
11ANNEX
Table L.A Enrollments by type of school, 1994
Education  level  Public  Private  Others  Total
Primary  13,593,797  895,913  40,689  14,530,399
Lower  Secondary  4,661,522  388,806  12,004  5,062,332
Upper Secondary  2,386,758  778,587  49,385  3,214,730
Tertiary  1,461,189  530,754  1,503  1,993,446
Source:  ENIGH  94
Table 2.A Enrollments by type of school, 1996
Public  Private  Others  Total
Primary  13,802,395  768,748  1,746  14,572,889
Lower  Secondary  4,972,116  326,229  4,153  5,302,498
Upper  Secondary  2,767,993  875,129  15,782  3,658,904
Tertiary  1,459,820  580,962  7,680  2,048,462
Source:  ENIGH  96
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